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Abstract
This paper analyzes the determinants of college enrolment and changes in these determi-
nants over time. I propose a quantitative life cycle model with college enrolment. Altruistic
parents provide financial support to their children. Using counterfactual experiments, I find
that 24 percent of all households are financially constrained in their college decision. Con-
straints become more severe over time.
I show that my model is consistent with a narrow college enrolment gap between students
from rich and poor families previously reported in the empirical literature. Estimating en-
rolment gaps is a popular reduced-form approach for measuring the fraction of constrained
households. My results suggest that these reduced-form estimates are misleading, and that a
structural model of parental transfers is needed to correctly identify constrained households.
Further, I show that parental transfers are an important driver behind the changing role of
family income as a determinant of college entry, a fact that is well-documented for the U.S.
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I Introduction
This paper examines the determinants of college enrolment in the U.S. economy. I present a rich
quantitative life cycle model in which altruistic parents invest in their children’s college education.
I use this model to shed new light on two long-standing questions. How large is the fraction of
households that invest inefficiently in college education because of borrowing constraints? Has the
share of constrained households changed over time?
These questions are of first-order importance for public policy. In this paper, I argue that both
questions can be answered only within a model where the determinants of parental transfers are
modeled explicitly.
A calibrated version of my model illustrates this point. According to the model, 24 percent
of households in the U.S. economy were constrained in their college decision at the beginning
of the 1980s. This result contrasts sharply with the findings presented in the previous literature.
In an influential paper, Carneiro and Heckman (2002) conclude that at most eight percent of the
population were constrained in their college decision. Carneiro and Heckman (2002) identify
borrowing-constrained households according to the college enrolment gap between children from
rich and poor families.
I show that my model is perfectly consistent with the finding of Carneiro and Heckman (2002).
Applying the method of Carneiro and Heckman (2002) to the data generated by my model pro-
duces an estimate for the enrolment gap between students from rich and poor families that is in
line with theirs. The discrepancy between the average enrolment gap and the findings from the
counterfactual experiment suggests that the latter method does not correctly identify households
that are financially constrained in their college decision.
I show that we can identify constrained households more accurately through a model in which
parental transfers are generated endogenously. In the U.S., financial assistance from family (i.e.,
parents) is an integral part of a students college financing. Gale and Scholz (1994) document that
parental payments amounted to 35 billion U.S. dollars (hereafter USD) in 1986. Keane and Wolpin
(2001) report that even students from poor families cover a substantial share of their total college
expenditures with the help of parental transfers.
When modeling intergenerational linkages, I follow the classical papers by Becker (1974),
Barro (1974), and Becker and Tomes (1979) and assume the existence of intergenerational borrow-
ing limits that prevent parents from borrowing against their children’s future earnings. In addition,
I assume that parental transfers are generated by one-sided altruism. I follow Laitner (2001) and
allow for imperfect altruism.1 The presence of an intergenerational borrowing constraint, and the
fact that altruism is only one-sided, imply that parents face a trade-off between saving for their
own future consumption and providing transfers to their children. As a result, parents may find it
optimal to underinvest in their children’s college education. If children face a life-cycle borrowing
constraint that prevents them from borrowing against their future earnings (Cunha and Heckman,
2007), the overall enrolment in college may be inefficiently low.
In the model, children are borrowing-constrained if the difference between the costs of tuition
and the amount of parental support exceeds the borrowing limit. The difference depends on the
1This means that the parent weights the utility of the child less than its own utility.
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decision of children to attend college and on the parental transfers. Children decide to enrol in
college based on tuition fees and on their ability to graduate. Tuition fees in turn are a function
of ability and parental resources. The willingness (and the ability) of parents to provide financial
aid is a function of their wealth, their income and their future earnings prospects. In essence,
binding borrowing constraints are the outcome of a high-dimensional decision problem involving
both children and parents.
Reduced-form approaches have trouble capturing the multidimensionality of the problem, given
that many factors influencing the decision of parents and children are not observable to the econo-
metrician. Moreover, since reduced-form estimates are based only on actual enrolment data, identi-
fying borrowing constraints requires strong assumptions about the counterfactual enrolment rates.
Using the average enrolment gap employed by Carneiro and Heckman (2002) and the counterfac-
tual enrolment rates generated by my model, I show that the required assumptions are not satisfied
in an environment where altruism is one-sided and intergenerational borrowing is prohibited.
The importance of modeling altruism becomes even more apparent when I analyze how the de-
terminants of college enrolment changed over time. In the data, family income gained importance
as a determinant of college entry between 1980 and 2000; see Ellwood and Kane (2000) and more
recently Belley and Lochner (2007). At the same time, tuition fees doubled in real terms, while
borrowing limits remained unchanged (Lochner and Monge-Naranjo, 2010). These facts together
suggest that borrowing constraints became binding for a larger fraction of the population, resulting
in wider enrolment gaps between children from rich and poor families. Between 1980 and 2000,
the U.S. economy also experienced an increase in the college premium and a rise in (within-group)
earnings; see e.g. Krueger and Perri (2006) and Heathcote et al. (2010).
Using the changes in the economic environment as inputs, I find that the model generates
wider enrolment gaps. Moreover, the fraction of households that are financially constrained in
their college decision increases from 24 to 28 percent. That is, the model suggests that bigger
enrolment gaps indeed are associated with a larger fraction of constrained households.
However, my results imply that larger enrolment gaps do not necessarily indicate tighter bor-
rowing constraints. In fact, I show that the widening of the enrolment gaps is the result of the
rise in earnings inequality, and not a consequence of tighter borrowing constraints. This finding
highlights the response of parental transfers as key for understanding the changing role of family
income in determining college entry.
Despite the importance of family transfers, intergenerational linkages are not modeled in most
quantitative studies of borrowing constraints. Notable exceptions are Keane and Wolpin (2001) as
well as Johnson (2011), who estimate a parental transfer function in reduced-form. However, this
approach implicitly assumes that parental transfers are invariant to policy changes. The present
paper is closely related to the important recent work of Brown et al. (2012), who also assume
one-sided altruism and intergenerational borrowing limits. They point out that almost all financial
aid packages expect financial assistance from family. This expected family contribution "is, how-
ever, neither legally guaranteed nor universally offered" (Brown et al., 2012, p. 1). The authors
document that about half of the children in the population are potentially constrained in the U.S.,
because their parents are relatively poor or selfish. This finding suggests that the results presented
here should be seen as a lower bound. Compared to Brown et al. (2012), the quantitative model
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I propose in this paper allows me to calculate the size of the bias that results if inference on the
extent of borrowing constraints is made without explicitly modeling parental transfer decisions.
Moreover, with the help of my model, I am able to study how changes in the economic environ-
ment affect the behavior of parental transfers. This question is also particularly interesting, given
the widening of college enrolment gaps observed over time.
Building on these insights, a growing body of the literature incorporates structural models of
parental transfers into quantitative life cycle models in order to study education policies. A recent
example is the work by Abbott, Gallipoli, Meghir and Violante (Abbott et al., 2013, henceforth
AGMV, 2013). AGMV (2013) also introduce an aggregate production function where different
types of human capital are not (necessarily) perfectly substitutable.2 With the help of their model,
the authors compute the equilibrium effects of different policy interventions on optimal education
decisions, inequality, and output.3 AGMV (2013) find that the response of parental transfers is
quantitatively significant for understanding the impact of policy interventions.
Other examples of papers that incorporate altruism in the study of education policies are
Restuccia and Urrutia (2004), Cunha (2007), Bohacek and Kapicka (2010), Holter (2013) and
Caucutt and Lochner (2012),. Some of these contributions focus on skill formation (e.g., Cunha,
2007) or on the relative importance of early versus late credit constraints, as e.g., Caucutt and
Lochner (2012). Bohacek and Kapicka (2010) study the welfare effects of educational reforms.
Both Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) and Holter (2013) are interested in the determinants of earnings
persistence. Cunha (2007) as well as Bohacek and Kapicka (2010) assume two-sided altruism:
families care about both their predecessors and their descendants. Under this assumption, parents
and children pool their resources and solve the same maximization problem. Two-sided altruism
thus implies that also children provide transfers to their parents. However, there is little evidence
of this in the data, as argued by Gale and Scholz (1994) and Brown et al. (2012). Caucutt and
Lochner (2012), Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) and Holter (2013) also assume one-sided altruism.
Relative to these papers, I focus on explaining the development of enrolment gaps over time and
on analyzing the impact of borrowing constraints.
Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2010) also argue that borrowing constraints became binding for
a larger fraction of the population between 1980 and 2000. Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2010)
derive borrowing constraints endogenously from the design of government student loan programs
and from limited repayment incentives in private lending markets. In this paper, I endogenize the
initial wealth distribution by assuming parental altruism. This enables me to compare my model
to the patterns of family income and college attendance that are observable in the data.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The model is presented in Section 2.
Section 3 gives the household’s problem in recursive notation, while Section 4 introduces the
equilibrium definition. The calibration of the model’s parameters is presented in Section 5. I
discuss my results in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2Earlier papers analyzing the general equilibrium implications of education policies include Heckman et al. (1998)
and Ábráhám (2008), who examines wage inequality and education policy in a general equilibrium OLG model with
skill-biased technological change.
3Garriga and Keightley (2007) are also interested in optimal education policies. They do not endogenize parental
transfers. Instead, they explicitly model the dropout decision and labor supply during college.
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II Model
Overview. I consider a life cycle economy with altruistic parents. Parents provide transfers to
their children. Children take parental transfers as given, and decide whether to attend college or
not. Children can also borrow against their future earnings. All other credit markets are closed;
in particular, parents are not allowed to borrow against the future income of their descendants. I
allow for idiosyncratic productivity shocks during working life. These assumptions allow me to
study the effects of an endogenously generated initial distribution of assets on college enrolment,
and to analyze the determinants of the initial asset distribution in a realistic life cycle setting.
The Life Cycle of a Household. There is a continuum of agents with total measure one. I
assume that the size of the population is constant over time. Let j denote the age of an agent,
j ∈ J = {1,2, ...,Jmax}. Agents enter the economy when they turn 21 (model period j = 1). Before
this age, they belong to their parent household and depend on its economic decisions. During the
first 45 years of their "economic" life, agents work. This implies that the agents work up to age
65 (model period Jwork = 45). Retirement takes place at the age of 66 ( j = 46), and is mandatory.
When agents turn 51 ( j = 31), their children of age 21 form their own household. This implies a
generational age gap of 30 years. It is assumed that there is one child household for each parent
household. Agents face a declining survival probability after their children leave home. Terminal
age is 81 (Jmax = 60). Since annuity markets are closed by assumption, agents may leave some
wealth upon the event of death. The remaining wealth of a deceased parent household is passed on
to its child household.
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Figure 1: Life cycle and Generation Structure
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The assumptions regarding the life cycle and the transfer behavior are summarized in Figure 1.
Labor Income Process. During each of the 45 periods of their working life, agents supply one
unit of labor inelastically.4 The productivity of this labor unit of an j-year old agent is measured
by εejη
j,e, where
{
εej
}Jw
j=1
is a deterministic age profile of average labor productivity of an agent
with education level e:5
e ∈ E = {hs,col}
where hs denotes high school education and col college education. For retired households and for
students attending college, εej = 0.
η j,e describes the stochastic labor productivity status of a j-year old agent with education
level e. Given the level of education e, I assume that the labor productivity process is identical
and independent across agents (no aggregate productivity shocks) and that it follows a finite-state
Markov process with stationary transition probabilities over time. More specifically,
Qe(ηe,Ne) = Pr(η j+1,e ∈ Ne|η j,e = ηe)
where Ne =
{
ηe1 ,η
e
2 , ...,η
e
n
}
is the set of possible realizations of the productivity shock ηe.
College Investment, College Attendance and College Completion. Upon entering the econ-
omy, all households possess a high school degree.
I assume that the time it takes to complete a college degree is four years. In the U.S., as well as
in other OECD countries, there is a significant fraction of students who enter college, but actually
leave school without having obtained a degree (see e.g., Restuccia and Urrutia, 2004; Akyol and
Athreya, 2005).
Upon entering college, students are required to possess enough resources to finance their stud-
ies. Financial conditions thus do not matter for college completion, which is consistent with evi-
dence provided by Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2008). In my model, students drop out because
they fail to achieve the requirements that are necessary to obtain a degree. I assume that more able
students are also more likely to graduate. Light and Strayer (2000) as well as Chatterjee and
Ionescu (2012) report that there is a strong positive correlation between college completion and
performance in scholastic tests. I denote the college dropout probability by λ .
In line with evidence provided by Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2008), I assume that the
time until dropout is two years. Akyol and Athreya (2005) cite evidence for the fact that the return
to the later years of college is substantially higher compared to the return to the first two years.
Based on this finding, I assume that college dropouts face the same earnings process as do high
school graduates. As a consequence, college investment is indivisible.
In what follows I discuss the formation of academic ability, the underlying force of behind
college success, in greater detail.
4College graduates work for fewer periods; see below.
5I do not consider high school dropouts. The share of high school dropouts is small in the data, see Rodriguez et al.
(2002) who measure a share of 17 percent in the 1998 SCF.
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Ability and its Formation. I define academic ability as the set of skills (both cognitive and
non-cognitive) that is relevant for success in college. Academic ability is thus denoted by the
college success probability (1−λ ). I assume that academic ability has no direct effect on earnings,
other than through education.6 Cawley et al. (2001) argue that it is hard to find an impact of
cognitive and non-cognitive skills on earnings, after controlling for schooling attainment.7
The formation of skills is an active research area. So far, it appears to be consensus that
the family "plays a powerful role in shaping abilities through genetics, parental investments and
through choice of child environments", as Cunha and Heckman (2007, p.1) put it. In order to
capture the role of genes, I assume that at the beginning of their life cycle, households are endowed
with innate ability f. Innate ability is partly transmitted from their parents, following a transition
matrix Γ.
Following Keane and Wolpin (2001), I assume that other determinants such as parental in-
vestments in early education and parental choices of child environments can be approximated by
the educational achievements of parents, in the following denoted by ep. In the data, educational
achievement is highly correlated across generations.8 Moreover, Carneiro et al. (2013) find that
an additional year of mother’s schooling increases the child’s performance on a standardized math
test by almost 0.1 of a standard deviation.9
Parental education ep and innate ability f interact in determining the academic ability and thus
also the probability of college success (1− λ ), respectively. Evidence presented by Cunha and
Heckman (2007) suggests that genes - innate ability in my context - and environmental factors
(approximated by parental education) interact in multiple ways during childhood and adolescence
in the formation of skills. Given these non-linearities, I do not impose any parametric structure on
the process of skill formation. Instead, I calibrate the values of λ that are associated with different
combinations of f and ep endogenously.
As mentioned above, there is strong positive correlation between the performance in standard-
ized test scores, such as the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) or the Scholastic Aptitude
Test (SAT), and college completion rates.10 Since a single test score is unlikely to capture the
full set of skills that is necessary for college success (Carneiro and Heckman, 2002), I distinguish
between "academic" ability and "observable" ability in the following.11
Let K denote a random variable with realization κa. κa denotes the performance of a young
6Also see Heathcote et al. (2010)
7Cawley et al. (2001) show that the fraction of wage variance explained by measures of cognitive ability after
controlling for human capital measures, such as education and work experience, is low. They argue that the correlation
between measured cognitive ability and schooling is so high that it is not possible to separate the two unless one is
willing to make strong assumptions the parametric structure (e.g., log-linearity and separability), which Cawley et al.
(2001) test and reject. The authors also provide evidence for the fact that non-cognitive skills (such as having self-
discipline to follow the rules) also impact earnings mainly through schooling attainment.
8See Black and Devereux (2010) for a comprehensive and recent review of the empirical literature.
9With respect to the channels that transmit the effect of maternal education to the child, they find a substantial role
played by income effects, delayed childbearing and assortative mating. Other potential channels that are mentioned in
the literature are neighborhood effects, family stability and preferences for education (Haveman and Wolfe, 1995).
10SAT scores and AFQT scores are highly correlated, see footnote 7 in Light and Strayer (2002).
11Moreover, as noted by Heckman et al. (2006) , standardized tests are affected by a person’s schooling and family
background at the time tests are taken, which makes test scores a noisy measure for true ability.
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household in standardized test scores. Both κa and λ are known to children (and their parents) at
the time the college decision is made, while only κa is observable by the public (e.g. colleges). I
will also refer to κa as "observable" ability. More specifically, I assume thatK ∼N (µf,ep,σf,ep),
where the mean and the standard deviation depend on f and ep, to account for the empirical fact
that test scores and college completion probabilities are correlated. Let f (µf,ep,σf,ep) be the cor-
responding probability density function. In the next section, I discuss the relationship between
observable ability and the cost of college.
In sum, my model of education and skill formation is consistent with the following empirical
patterns: (i) a positive correlation between college attendance/completion and measures of ability,
(ii) a positive correlation between college attendance/completion and parental education, (iii) a
positive correlation between measures of ability and earnings.
Direct Cost of College Education. I assume that the cost of college is perfectly negatively
correlated with observable ability. That is, the cost of college is given by κ =−κa. Two remarks are
in order. First, since κa can be positive or negative, κ can be positive or negative as well. Negative
cost of education should be interpreted as a stipend which covers part of the living expenses.12
Second, because of the tight relationship between observable ability and the cost of education, I
will use the terms "observable ability" and "cost of college" as synonyms in the remainder of the
paper.
A negative link between observable ability and tuition arises through the admission policy of
U.S. college and universities. These institutions compete for the best students (i.e. those with the
highest test scores) with the help of financial aid packages (Linsenmeier et al., 2002). As a result,
better students pay less in order to enrol in college.13
Individual aid packages can be based explicitly on academic promise and achievement (so
called "merit aid"). Only a small fraction of students are recipients of merit aid. Most students
receive so called "need-based aid", which is officially based on their "expected family contribution
to pay" (further details follow below). Here, it is important to note that most financial aid packages
are implicitly based on student’s merit, even if they are labeled differently.14
The following figures make this point clear. A 100 point difference in the SAT increases (need-
based) grant aid between 500 and 2,300 USD (in 1996 prices) over the course of a college career
(McPherson and Schapiro, 2006). Private institutions typically have more resources at their dis-
posal and therefore offer more generous aid packages (Long, 2004; Collegeboard, 2010). These
findings imply that a student from the lower end of the ability distribution has to pay between 3,000
12As I will outline in the calibration procedure (see Section 5) the share of students with negative cost of college
turns out to be below 1 percent, which is in line with the fraction of students that receive generous grants.
13More talented students are more likely to generate positive peer effects, thus enhancing the education of all
students. Attracting students with higher levels of measured quality is also important for an institution’s reputation,
see McPherson and Schapiro (2006).
14McPherson and Schapiro (2006) write: "Normal practice at American colleges is to present a prospective student
with a "package" of aid, generally including some combination of federal, state and institutional grant, a recommended
loan, and a work-study job. [. . .] By the same token, two students at the same college, both receiving only need-based
aid, may receive quite different aid packages. The more desirable student may receive either a larger total aid package
or a similar total aid package with a larger component of grant aid and lower amounts of loan and work. And this can
happen without any of the dollars being labeled "merit" dollars. (McPherson and Schapiro (2006, pp. 1412-1413).
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and 14,000 USD more for his college education than does a student at the upper end.15
The fact that the direct cost of college education is lower for young households with higher
levels of observable ability generates heterogeneity with respect to the total cost of college educa-
tion. All other things equal, more able students will be more likely to attend college, a pattern that
is observable in the data. Other dimensions of heterogeneity of the cost and return of attending
college are generated by assuming that financial aid is higher for students from poorer families,
which are discussed in the next section. The (expected) return of attending college differs because
more able students are more likely to complete their education.16
Subsidies and Need-Based Financial Aid. Need-based financial assistance is based on the
ability of the student’s family to pay, the so-called "expected family contribution". It is calculated
on the bases on parental income and wealth (Feldstein, 1995). A student with poor parents can
expect to receive more financial assistance than can a student whose parents are well off. I denote
the fraction of direct college expenses (κ) that is covered by financial aid by ν . The net direct costs
of college attendance, after financial help is taken into account, are given by (1−ν)κ(I(κ) > 0),
where I(κ) is an indicator function taking the value 1 if college expenses are positive.17 ν is
a function of parental income and parental assets, ν(yp,ap). Because parental assets enter the
calculation of the expected family contribution, there is an "education tax rate" on capital income,
which has a powerful adverse effect on capital accumulation, according to Feldstein (1995). Two
remarks regarding the expected family contribution are in order. First of all, as pointed out by
Brown et al. (2012), the expected family contribution that is calculated from the family’s ability
to pay is not legally guaranteed. Put differently, children cannot force parents to give what they
are expected to pay. Second of all, as noted by Dick and Edlin (1997), the financial aid that the
student actually receives does not necessarily cover the difference between the expected family
contribution and the cost of college. Federal programs do not provide enough subsidized aid to
meet the needs of all students, and most colleges are not committed to covering the entire residual
(Dick and Edlin, 1997).
15These figures are based on the assumption that students at the lower end of the distribution have a SAT score
below 700, while students at the upper end have a score above 1300. According to Chatterjee and Ionescu (2012), 8
percent of the students who took the SAT score below 700, while about 15 percent score higher than 1300.
16There are other ways to generate heterogeneity. In important contributions, Gallipoli et al. (2010) and Heathcote
et al. (2010) assume that tuition is the same for everybody. Instead, they assume that college education is associated
with utility costs ("psychic" costs), which are higher for the less able. Heckman et al. (2005) argue that the direct costs
of college education are the sum of tuition and psychic costs. To what extent the direct costs are determined by tuition
or by psychic costs remains an open question. The reason is that it is not possible to measure psychic costs directly in
the data (Heckman et al., 2005, footnote 32). According to Heckman et al. (2005), psychic costs are needed to explain
the observation that the take-up rate is low, despite the fact that (ex-post) monetary return from attending college is
high. Recently, Ozdagli and Trachter (2009) show that this so-called "returns to education puzzle" can be explained
if one allows for risk-averse decision makers, who face the uncertainty about the outcome of college. Ozdagli and
Trachter (2009) conclude that this provides "[. . .] a less controversial explanation for the once obscure psychic costs"
(p. 25). Moreover, estimates provided by Dynarski (2003) suggest a quantitatively significant role of tuition costs in
explaining college enrolment. She finds that increasing tuition subsidies by 1,000 USD (in 1998 prices) raises college
enrolment by 4 percentage points. In the appendix, I show that my modeling strategy is consistent with the empirical
elasticities found by Dynarski (2003).
17Recall that negative direct costs from college may occur if the measured ability of the student is very high and the
student receives a scholarship.
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Assets and Loans. Households accumulate savings in the form of assets a j. They borrow
by taking out loans χ . Consequently, a j ≥ 0 and χ ≥ 0. Borrowing can take place only at the
beginning of the life cycle, either to finance college education, or non-college related expenses, or
both.
Loans are assumed to be closed-end installment loans, which are characterized by fixed pay-
ments and a fixed term. This assumption is motivated by the fact that college loans are commonly
closed-end loans, see e.g. Gallipoli et al. (2010). Moreover, installment loans are the most siz-
able component of unsecured consumer debt.18 Consequently, I abstract from "open-ended" credit
(such as credit card debt). The assumption that all borrowing takes place at the beginning reflects
the findings that this is the stage of the life cycle when credit is most needed.19
I assume that the terms and conditions for χ follow those for U.S. college loans. In the follow-
ing, I outline some institutional details regarding the market for college loans. The bulk of loans
are provided under government-sponsored loan programs (GSL), such as Perkins or Stafford.20
All loan programs have in common that participants must repay their loans in full, regardless of
whether they complete college successfully (Chatterjee and Ionescu, 2012). This implies that fi-
nancing college by loans is associated with a substantial financial risk.
Participating students can defer loan payments until six (Stafford) or nine (Perkins) months
after leaving school (Lochner and Monge-Naranjo, 2010).21 Under the standard repayment plan,
borrowers have up to ten years to repay their loan in full. However, there are several circumstances
under which borrowers can postpone their repayments, for example in times of economic hardship.
At the maximum, borrowers can extend the repayment period up to 25 years.22 As an approxima-
tion, I assume that all borrowers repay their loans in 25 years, starting from the year in which
college students graduate.23
I denote the per-period installment by l j. College students are exempted from debt service
while enrolled in college, which implies that l j = 0 if 1 ≤ j ≤ 4 and for all j ≥ 31. Accrued
18Using the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), Kennickell and Shack-Marquez (1992) report that 42 percent
of all households whose head is younger than 35 years have taken out installment loans (other than car loans) in
1983. At the beginning of the 1980s, installment loans were the most important form of unsecured consumer debt.
Installment loans appeared not only to be more frequent, but also to be bigger. The median amount of installment
debt carried by households was 1,600 USD, whereas it was just 600 USD in form of credit card debt (in 1989 dollars).
More recent waves of the SCF confirm this pattern.
19Kaplan and Violante (2010) compute that more than 40 percent of households borrow at the beginning of the
life cycle. The desire to borrow vanishes as households grow older, and approaches zero around the age of 50. This
corresponds roughly to the pattern that we observe in the SCF, see Kennickell et al. (2009). In my benchmark
calibration, which I outline below, the fraction of households that have zero financial wealth after age 22 is only 4
percent.
20At least until the mid-1990s, only a few private lenders offered student loans outside the government-sponsored
loan programs (Lochner and Monge-Naranjo, 2010). Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2010) report that amount of stu-
dent loans coming from private sources has risen since then, although private loans appear to be most prevalent among
graduate students in professional schools and undergraduates at high-cost private universities.
21Unsubsidized loans accrue interest over the deferment period. Accrued interest payments are added to the loan
principal. For subsidized loans, the government covers the interest on loans while students are enrolled (Lochner and
Monge-Naranjo, 2010).
22http://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/understand/plans (retrieved on February 9, 2013)
23Since death does not occur before the age of 53 (j=33), no agent dies in negative net worth.
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interest is accumulated and added to the principal. After having finished college, the total amount
due is thus given by χ(1+ r∗)4, where r∗ is the subsidized interest rate on college loans, r∗ < r.
Loans are subsidized by the government. For 5 ≤ j ≤ 30, l j is calculated as follows. First, I
assume that the repayment scheme is fixed, as it is common for installment loans. In addition, I
also assume that the (per-period) loan redemption ι is constant and given by χ(1+r
∗)4
25 . This implies
that residual debt declines at a linear rate over the repayment period. Because of falling interest
payments, l j falls from ι+ r∗χ(1+ r)4 to 0 between j = 5 and j = 31.
I assume that the interest rate, net of capital taxes or subsidies, is the same for assets and
loans. This requires that r∗ = (1− τk)r. Together with the repayment structure, this implies that
I can assume that all households take out loans up to the upper limit χ¯ . The amount of the loan
resources that households do not spend on college or non-college related expenses can be saved in
financial assets. By doing so, households can exactly replicate the payment stream resulting from
the loan. This simplifies the household’s decision problem considerably, since I do not need to
keep track of the debt holdings of each individual household. I further assume that the loan system
is managed by a financial intermediary, and that the subsidy on the interest rate is covered by the
government.
With respect to the existence of borrowing limits, Keane and Wolpin (2001) document that
borrowing limits exist and are tight. They report that the maximum annual amount of loans that
can be taken out of the GSL Program is about 25 percent of the average undergraduate tuition,
room and board expenses across two and four year colleges in the academic year 1997-98. They
conclude that it is impossible to finance even one year of college using uncollateralized loans.24
Altruism and the Timing of Parental Transfers. Besides loans, parental transfers are the
other source of financing at the beginning of the life cycle. In the model, there are intended and
unintended transfers flowing from parents to their children. Intended transfers are generated by
one-sided altruism, as in Laitner (2001), Nishiyama (2002) and Brown et al. (2012).25 One-sided
altruism implies that parents care about the lifetime well-being of their mature children, but not
the other way round. I assume that a parent household decides about intended transfers at the
age of 51, when the child household is 21 and forms an independent household. Gale and Scholz
(1994) find that the mean age of transfer-givers is 55 years in the 1983-1986 Survey of Consumer
Finances.
Given the initial endowment received from the parent, the child can then decide whether to
consume the resources received from the parent, save it for future consumption, and/or spend it for
college investment. It is important to note that because parents are altruistic, they anticipate the
division of their transfers that is optimal from the children’s point of view. The resulting allocation
24Keane and Wolpin (2001) identify borrowing constraints by measuring net worth. The proportion of the sample
with negative net worth increases from 11.5 percent at age 20 to 16.3 percent at age 25 and then falls to 9.1 percent
at age 30. Keane and Wolpin (2001) further report that average net debt, conditioning on having negative net worth is
generally on the order of 5,000 USD. At age 25, i.e. shortly after college, 16 percent of the group with negative net
worth held debt of more than 10,000 USD and 20 percent less than 1,000 USD, which are small amounts, given that
the average undergraduate tuition, room and board expenses across two and four year colleges in the academic year
1997-98 amounted to almost 10,000 USD, according to Keane and Wolpin (2001)
25I allow for the fact that altruism may be imperfect.
10
is the same as if parents decided themselves on the optimal split between education investment and
pure financial transfers.26
Unintended transfers take the form of end-of-life bequests and arise because lifetime is uncer-
tain and annuity markets are absent. Upon the event of death, the remaining parental wealth is
passed on to the children.
A remark regarding the timing of the transfers is in order. As noted by Laitner (2001), if chil-
dren are not borrowing-constrained, the timing of transfers is indeterminate. In this case, parents
are indifferent between giving transfers at the beginning of the child’s life cycle in the form of
inter-vivos transfers, at the end of their own life in form of bequests, or by making a sequence of
gifts in-between. This holds as parents can commit to a specific sequence of transfers, implying
that parents and children do not strategically interact. If however children face (potentially) binding
borrowing constraints, it is optimal for an altruistic parent to make transfers as early as possible,
i.e. at the beginning of the life cycle. The result that binding liquidity constraints trigger transfers
holds, even if there is no commitment and parents and children play a dynamic game (Barczyk
and Kredler, 2013). There is indeed ample empirical evidence for the fact that households that are
subject to binding borrowing constraints are more likely to receive transfers (see e.g., Cox, 1990).
In line with this evidence, I assume that all intended transfers resulting from parental altruism are
made at the beginning of the child’s life cycle, when borrowing constraints are most likely to be
binding.
Technology. A representative firm produces a final output good Y using aggregate physical
capital K and aggregate labor measured in efficiency units L as inputs. The production technology
F(K,L) obeys constant returns to scale.
Government. The government collects taxes from labor and asset income at rates (τw,τk). Tax
revenues are used to finance pension benefits pen, college subsidies ν , and subsidies on the interest
rate r. The government adjusts τw in order to balance its budget in every period.
III Recursive Problem
It is convenient to describe the recursive problem by going backward from retirement age. There-
fore I first consider the optimization problem of a parent household, then the problem of a child
household.
Parent households
A parent household is of age j such that 31≤ j ≤ Jmax. A parent household works during the first
15 years and is retired afterwards. The household faces a declining survival probability, ψ j < 1 if
j ≥ 33.
26In the following, I will use the terms "financial transfers", "inter vivos transfers" and "financial inter vivos trans-
fers" interchangeably.
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Parent Households, After Retirement. When retired ( j ∈ {46, ...Jmax}), the household re-
ceives social security benefits, pen, and chooses consumption c j and its end-of-period wealth level
a j+1. The optimization problem of this household can be written in recursive formulation as fol-
lows:
Vp,r(s jp,r) = maxc j,a j+1
{
u(c j)+βψ jVp,r(s j+1p,r )
}
(1)
where β is the discount factor. Vp,r(sp,r) is the value function of a retired household facing a state
vector sp,r, given by
s jp,r = (a j, j)
The household maximizes (1) subject to
a j+1 = (1+ r(1− τk))a j + pen− c j,
a j+1 ≥ 0 and c j ≥ 0
r is the interest rate on capital, and taxes on capital income are denoted by τk In the terminal
period Jmax = 60, the continuation value is zero. Households consume their remaining wealth and
aJmax+1 = 0.
Parent Households, Working, After Transfers Have Been Made. A parent household who
is working and who has provided transfers to its child household is j years old, where 32≤ j≤ 45.
This household earns w per (efficient) unit of labor, which is supplied inelastically. Total labor
productivity depends on the education level e as well as on the realization of the idiosyncratic
productivity shock η j,e. The parents’ problem then reads as follows:
Vp,w(s jp,w) = maxc j,a j+1
{
u(c j)+βψ j ∑
η j+1,e∈Ne
Vp,w(s j+1p,w )Q
e(η j,e,η j+1,e)
}
(2)
where Qe(η j,e,η j+1,e) is the law of motion for productivity shock and s jp,w is the vector of state
variables at age j, given by
s jp,w = (a j,e,η
j,e, j)
Agents maximize (2) subject to the budget constraint
a j+1 = (1+ r(1− τk))a j +(1− τw)wεejη j,e− c j,
where τw denotes a linear tax on labor income. Again, financial assets are required to be positive:
a j+1 ≥ 0 and c j ≥ 0
In the last period before retirement ( j = 45), the continuation value is replaced by βψ jVp,r(s j+1p,r ).
Parent Household, First Period: I now describe the parental problem in the first period of
parenthood j = 31. At this stage, parents choose their own savings a j+1 and the transfers to their
child household in such a way that their total utility is maximized. Transfers are denoted by tra.
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Expressed in terms of a Bellman equation, the decision problem of a parent household at j = 31
reads as
Vp,w(s31p,w) = maxc31,a32,tra
{
u(c31)+βψ31∑η32,e∈Ne Vp,w(s32p,w)Qe(η31,e,η32,e)
+ςV0(s0)
}
(3)
where ς is the intergenerational discount factor. I allow for imperfect altruism, that is, 0≤ ς ≤ 1.
If ς = 0, parents care only about their own utility. The model thus nests a pure life cycle economy
(ς = 0) and a dynastic model (ς = 1) as extreme cases. Both Laitner (2001) and Nishiyama (2002)
show that the observable flow of transfers is consistent with an intermediate case.
V0(s0) denotes the discounted lifetime utility of a young household at the beginning of its
economic life. It depends on s0 = (tra,κ,f,ep). V0(s0) is described in greater detail in the next
section.
Parent households face the following state variables at j = 31:
s31p,w = (a31,e,η
31,e,f,κ)
Notice that the innate ability level of the child f and the level of κ are part of the parent house-
hold’s state space because together with the parental education level e, these variables determine
the cost of college and the likelihood of dropping out of college.
The parental budget constraint is given by
a32 = (1+ r(1− τk))a31 +(1− τw)εe31η31,ew− tra− c31
a j+1 ≥ 0 and cp,1 ≥ 0
In the following, I describe the problem of a young (child) household.
Young households
Young households are of age 1≤ j≤ 30. The problem of a young household depends on the status
of its parents. Children with parents who are living expect to receive bequests in the future, and
thus need to keep track of their parents’ wealth holdings. In the following, I distinguish between
young households with deceased parents and those with living parents. Since parent household do
not die before age j = 33, the problem of a young household with deceased parents starts at the
age of j = 3.27
Young households with deceased parents: I first describe the recursive problem of a young
household whose parents are deceased. The optimization problem of this household reads as
Vy,d(s
j
y,d) = maxc j,a j+1
{
u(c j)+β ∑
η j+1,e∈Ne
Vy,d(s
j+1
y,d )Q
e(η j,e,η j+1,e)
}
(4)
27This is for simplicity, as parental education is an important determinant of children’s dropout probability. Recall
that students who leave college without a degree do this at the end of model period j = 2.
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where Vy,d(.) is the value function of a young household with deceased parents and sy,d is the vector
of state variables in period j, which is given by
s jy,d = (a j,f,e,η
j,e, j)
Agents maximize (4) subject to the constraints
a j+1 = (1+ r(1− τk))a j +(1− τw)wεejη j,e− c j− l j
a j+1 ≥ 0 and c j ≥ 0
.
College students (e=col) do not receive income while enrolled, that is, εe=colj = 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤
4. Moreover, by assumption, debt does not need to be serviced in the first four years (l j = 0),
independent of the education level.
At j = 30, in the last period before young households become parents, the continuation value
is replaced by
β∑
fc
∑
η j+1,e∈Ne
∫
κ
Vp,w(s31p,w) f (κ;µf,ep,σf,ep)dκQ
e(η j,e,η j+1,e)Γ(f,fc)
where the transmission of household-specific types between (becoming) parents and their chil-
dren needs to be taken into account.
Young households whose parents are living. I now consider the problem of a young house-
hold with living parents. I denote the asset holdings of the parents of a household at age j by
apj .
The child household does not know when the parent household dies. As a consequence, the
value function is a weighted sum of the utility it receives if the parent household dies and the utility
it obtains if the parent continues to live for another period. Since the age gap between parent and
child households is 30 years, the survival probability of the parent household is given by ψ j+30.
The optimization problem can thus be described by the following functional equation:
Vy,a(s jy,a) = maxc j,a j+1
{
u(c j)+β (1−ψ j+30)∑η j+1,e∈Ne Vy,d(s j+1y,a )Qe(η ,e,η j+1,e)
+βψ j+30∑η j+1,e∈Ne Vy,a(s
j+1
y,a )Qe(η ,e,η j+1,e)
}
(5)
The state vector s jy,a is given by
s jy,a = (a j,a
p
j ,f,e,e
p,η j,e,η j
p,ep , j)
Rational expectations imply that children are perfectly able to forecast their parents’ asset hold-
ings. Therefore, children know the law of motion of parents’ asset holdings, and apj , e
p, η jp,ep
become part of the children’s information set. When parents are retired, this reduces to apj .
College students deserve special attention, as they face a certain probability of leaving college
without graduating. In line with empirical evidence I discussed above, I assume that dropping out
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occurs after two years of college. Hence, at j = 2, the recursive problem of college students reads
as follows:
Vy,a(s j=2y,a |e=col)= maxc j,a j+1
{
u(c j)+β (1−λf,ep)∑η j+1,e∈Ne Vy,a(s j=3y,a |e=col)Qe=col(η j,e=col,η j+1,e=col)
+βλf,ep∑η j+1,e∈Ne Vy,a(s
j=3
y,a |e=hs)Qe=hs(η j+1,e=hs,η j+1,e=hs)
}
(6)
where λf,ep is the probability of dropping out from college without a degree. λ depends the
innate ability f and the level of parental education ep.
At the age of j = 30, the child household knows that its parent household will die in the current
period. The continuation value is as stated above for the young households with deceased parents.
The budget constraint depends on whether the parent household died in the previous period, or
not. If not, the constraints are given by
a j+1 = (1+ r(1− τk))a j +(1− τw)wεejη j,e− c j− l j,
a j+1 ≥ 0 and c j ≥ 0
Again, college students (e=col) do not receive income while enrolled and εe=colj = 0 for 1 ≤
j ≤ 4. Moreover, l j = 0) if 1≤ j ≤ 4, independent of the education level.
If the parent household dies in period j− 1, the child household inherits residual (end-of-
period) wealth holdings of their parents, and the per-period flow budget constraint reads as
a j+1 = (1+ r(1− τk))(a j +apj )+(1− τw)wεejη j,e− c j− l j
a j+1 ≥ 0 and c j ≥ 0
Young Households, College Investment Decision. At the beginning of their economic life,
young households receive transfers tra from their parents, and decide whether to attend college and
how much money to borrow. I assume that these events take place before the realization earnings
shock and before consumption and saving decisions are made in the first period.
The college investment decision is based on the cost of college κ as well as on the innate ability
f and parental education ep. Because the productivity shocks η j,e depend on the education level,
the decision whether to attend college needs to be taken before the first period’s productivity shock
η1,e materializes.
V0(s0) = max
e∈{hs,col},a1
{
E
[
Vy,a(s j=1y,a |e=col,a1)
]
,E
[
Vy,a(s j=1y,a |e=hs,a1)
]}
(7)
where the subscript 0 indicates that the college enrolment decision takes place before young
households have taken other economic actions. The expectation is taken on with respect to the set
of possible productivity shocks in the first period.28
The constraints of this problem are as follows:
28I assume that productivity shocks in the first period are equally likely.
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a1 = tra+ χ¯−κ|e=colν(ap,1,εejη31,ew)
a1 ≥ 0
The state vector that households face when making this decision is given by
s0 = (tra,κ,f,ep)
Young households take parental transfers tra as given. All young households borrow up to the
maximum debt limit, which is χ¯ .29 Based on the cost of college (net of subsidies) κν , households
decide whether to attend college. The optimal education choice for an individual who faces the
state vector s0 is described by edu(s0). The residual financial resources a1 are kept for future
consumption.
IV Definition of a Stationary Competitive Equilibrium
Define S as the state space corresponding to the vector of state variables in the household problems
(1-7) with generic element s. Let ΣS be the sigma algebra on S and denote the corresponding
measurable space by (S,ΣS). The measure of households on (S,ΣS) is denoted by Φ.
I define a stationary recursive equilibrium in the economy I study as follows:
Definition 1 Given a government policy {pen,τk} and a college subsidy rule ν , a Stationary Re-
cursive Competitive Equilibrium is a set of value functions V (s) and a set of policy functions
{edu(s),c(s),a(s), tra(s)}, non-negative prices of physical capital and of effective labor {r,w},
and a measure of household Φ such that the following hold:
1. Given prices and policies, the value functions V (s) are the solutions to problems (1)-(7). The
functions {edu(s),c(s),a(s), tra(s)} are the associated policy functions.
2. The prices r and w are consistent with profit maximization of the firm, i.e.
r+δ = FK(K,L)
w = FL(K,L)
3. The labor tax rate τw adjusts such that the government’s budget is balanced:
τw =
pen
∫
Sp,r
dΦ+Ξ+Λ− τkrK
wL
29As outlined above, the assumption that all households borrow up to the limit is inconsequential, since the interest
rates on borrowing and lending are the same.
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where the total amount of college subsidies Ξ is given by
Ξ=
∫
Sy,0
(1−ν(ap,1,εejη31,ew))κedu(sy,0)dΦ
and the total amount of subsidies on the interest rate for loans Λ is given by
Λ= (r− r∗)
∫
Sy,0
χ¯dΦ
4. The financial intermediary runs a balanced budget:
∫
Sy,0
χ¯dΦ=
∫
S j≤30
ιdΦ
5. The asset market, the labor market and the final good market clear:
K =
∫
S
a(s)dΦ
L =
∫
S j≤JWork
εhsj η
j,hsdΦ+
∫
S j≤JWork
εcolj η
j,coldΦ
C+δK + I = F(K,L)
where
C =
∫
S
c(s)dΦ
I = κ
∫
Sy,0
ν(ap,1,εejη
31,ew)edu(s)dΦ
6. The Aggregate Law of Motion is stationary:
Φ= H(Φ)
The function H is generated by the policy functions a(s), c(s), tra(s), edu(s), the transition
matrix of productivity shocks, Qe(η j,e,η j+1,e), the distribution ofK , f (κ;µf,ep,σf,ep) and
transition matrix of innate ability Γ(f,fc).
Notice that the stationarity condition requires that child households are (on average) "identical"
to their parents in the sense that they reproduce their parent households’ distributions once they
become parents themselves. This in turn implies that the distribution of transfers and inheritances
that child households receive is consistent with the distribution of transfers that parent households
actually leave. I present more details about the computational procedure in the appendix.
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V Parameterization and Calibration
Experiment Design. Before turning to a detailed description of my calibration strategy, I outline
the design of my quantitative experiments. I conduct two main experiments. The aim of the
first experiment is to calculate the fraction of households that would have enrolled in college at the
beginning of the 1980s, all other things equal, if borrowing limits on student loans had been absent.
In order to implement this experiment, I first compute the equilibrium allocation generated by a
version of the model which is consistent with key statistics of the U.S. economy at the beginning
of the 1980s. More specifically, I target the size of parental transfers, the college enrolment rate,
the dropout rates and correlation of college education across generations. The resulting allocation
is labeled as benchmark calibration or "economy 1980". In the appendix, I show that the economy
1980 is also consistent with a series of other empirical regularities related to college enrolment
behavior in the U.S., which are not used as targets in the calibration procedure.
In a second step, I measure the fraction of households that enroll in college if I remove the bor-
rowing limit on student loans. The fraction of constrained households is given by the difference
in the enrolment rate of two economies. The first is the benchmark economy without the borrow-
ing limit on student loans. The second is the benchmark economy where the borrowing limit on
student loans is in place. I assume that households do not anticipate the regime change. As a con-
sequence, I keep the wealth distribution of parents at age 51 constant across the two experiments.
Parents cannot adjust their saving decisions prior to the relaxation of the borrowing limit. Note that
they can adjust their transfer behavior after the regime change. Moreover, I hold aggregate prices
fixed, in order to make sure that households make their college decision in the same economic
environment.
I conduct a second experiment in order to analyze how the increase in the skill premium, greater
residual earnings inequality, a rise in tuition fees, and a decline in the real interest rate affect the
fraction of borrowing-constrained households. Again, I assume that the changes in the economic
environment are not anticipated, as in Heathcote et al. (2010). This means that I must keep the
wealth distribution of parents at the age of 51 constant with respect to the economy 1980. House-
holds conduct the saving decisions that give rise to this distribution under the assumption that the
environment of the economy 1980 persists forever.30 I label the resulting allocation as "economy
2000". The computation of the constrained households is equivalent to that in the economy 1980.
Finally, the development in the fraction of constrained households over time can be computed by
comparing the fraction of constrained households in each of the economies 1980 and 2000.
In the following, I describe the calibration procedure in more detail.
Economy 1980
I distinguish between parameters that are set outside the model and others that are calibrated inter-
nally. Table 1 summarizes the first set of parameters, while table 2 gives an overview of the second
set.
30I also conducted experiments where I allow the distribution of parents to adjust. See Footnote 45 for a brief
summary of the major changes.
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Parameters Set Outside of the Model
Technology, Demographics and Preferences. Utility from consumption in each period is given
by u(c) = c
1−γ
1−γ . Production follows the aggregate production function F(K,L) = K
αL1−α , where L
is aggregate labor measured in efficiency units (see equation 5). By assumption, college graduates
have a skill premium and supply more labor in efficiency units than do high school graduates.
The skill-premium is independent of the fraction of high-skilled labor.31 I set the capital share in
income (α) equal to 0.36, as estimated by Prescott (1986). Following Imrohoroglu et al. (1995)
and Heer (2001), I assume that capital depreciates at an annual rate of 8 percent. The conditional
survival probability ψ j is taken from the National Vital Statistics Report, Vol. 53, No. 6 (2004)
and refers to the conditional survival probability for the U.S. population. Only values between
age 53 and age 80 are used. I assume that the survival probability is zero for agents at age 81.
The survival probability for households younger than 53 years is set equal to 1.32 The preference
parameter γ determines the relative risk aversion and is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution. I follow Attanasio et al. (1999) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002) who estimate
γ using consumption data and find a value of 1.5. This value is well within the interval of 1 to 3
commonly used in the literature.
Earnings Process. I assume that the process that governs the productivity shocks η j,e follows
an AR(1) process with persistence parameter ρhs for high school graduates and ρcol for college
graduates. The variance of the innovations are σhs and σ col , respectively. These parameters are
estimated by Hubbard et al. (1995) (HSZ in the following) from the 1982 to 1986 Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID).
They find that high school graduates have a lower earnings persistence and a higher variance
(ρhs = 0.946, σhs = 0.025) compared to college graduates (ρcol = 0.955, σ col = 0.016). Storeslet-
ten et al. (2004b) confirm these findings.33
These estimates are based on data from the beginning of the 1980s. However, parental transfers
that occurred in the 1980s originate from savings that were accumulated in the 1970s or even
earlier. Since the U.S. economy experienced an increase in residual earnings inequality between
the 1970s and the 1980s, the earnings risk that those parents faced was lower than indicated by the
estimates from Hubbard et al. (1995) for the 1980s.
Gottschalk et al. (1994) show that the permanent and the transitory variances changed on av-
erage by about 40 percent between the 1970s and the 1980s, with a somehow bigger change for
high school graduates and a somehow smaller change for college graduates. See Gottschalk et al.
(1994), Table 1.
Based on these findings, I reduce the variance of the earnings innovation for college graduates
by 21 percent, and by 48 percent for high school graduates. This implies a σhs = 0.0169 for high
31The implicit underlying assumption is that efficiency units supplied by high school and college graduates are
perfect substitutes in the production process. AGMV (2013) allow for imperfect substitutability.
32The actual survival probability before 53 is close to 1. See the National Vital Statistics Report.
33It should be noted that the estimates are rather conservative as HSZ use the combined labor income of the husband
and wife (if married) plus unemployment insurance for their estimates. I approximate the earnings process with a four-
state Markov process using the procedure proposed by Tauchen and Hussey (1991).
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school graduates and a σ col = 0.013225 for college graduates. The respective standard deviations
are 0.13 and 0.115. The changes are in the range estimated by Meghir and Pistaferri (2004).
I also take the average age-efficiency profile εej from HSZ, which gives me an estimate of the
college premium for different age groups. The authors find that earnings are more peaked for
college families, in line with findings from other empirical studies. By estimating a fixed-effect
model, Gallipoli et al. (2010) propose an alternative way of calibrating the earnings process.34
Pension Benefits. Pension benefits are calculated using the following formula:
pen = rep(1− τw)w× average lifetime efficiency hs graduates
where rep denotes the replacement rate, which I set equal to 0.4, following De Nardi (2004). The
average lifetime productivity of a high school graduate follows from HSZ. Pension benefits thus
amount to 40 percent of the average net wage of a high school graduate. Recall that τw and w are
determined in equilibrium.
College Subsidies. In the model, the government subsidizes college education. Subsidies are
decreasing in parental income and asset holdings, such that children from richer families receive
less support. This reflects the financial aid system at U.S. institutions. Colleges and universities
assign financial aid based on the difference between the cost of attending and the so-called "ex-
pected family contribution (EFC)", see Feldstein (1995). The EFC is computed according to the
discretionary income and the available assets of the applicant’s family. Discretionary income con-
sists of capital and labor income. Available assets are calculated as the difference between current
wealth holdings and a wealth level that is deemed to maintain the current standard of living, which
I denote by a¯.
For simplicity and because this specification is common in the literature, I assume that the
fraction of college expenses that is covered by the subsidy is linearly decreasing in the level of
parental resources:
ν = max({ν0−νasset(max(0,a31p,w− a¯)+(1− τk)ra31p,w)−νlabor (1− τw)εejη j,ew)},0) (8)
where ν0,νasset ,νlabor ≥ 0. I assume that a¯ is two-thirds of the average wealth level in the
economy. This choice ensures that a substantial fraction of the population has asset holdings below
the threshold. There are three other parameters to be chosen: ν0, νasset and νlabor. ν0 determines
the maximum fraction of college expenses that can be covered by the subsidy. The parameters
νasset and νlabor determine how fast this fraction decreases with asset income and labor income,
respectively.
I set ν0 to 0.75. This decision is based on the observation that in 1979-1980, even students from
families in the bottom income quintile financed a significant amount of their college expenses with
34I do not adjust the college premium because it was - at least on average - constant during the 1970s. The male
college premium fell slightly at the beginning of the 1970s and has been increasing since the end of the 1980s. See
Heathcote et al. (2010), Figure 1.
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the help of parental transfers. See the evidence cited in Keane and Wolpin (2001).35
Feldstein (1995) reports that the implied marginal tax rates on (adjustable) income lie between
22 and 47 percent according to the so-called uniform methodology, which was used to calculate
the EFC at the beginning of the 1980s. I choose a value for νasset of 0.2, which is at the lower
end of the spectrum reported by Feldstein (1995). Feldstein (1995) finds that the implied capital
levy by the EFC can be quite high. In a sense, the saving distortions implied by my calibration are
expected to be lower on average than the distortions that result from the U.S. system.
In the data, the share of college expenses financed with parental transfers increases rapidly in
the level of total parental income (Keane and Wolpin, 2001).36 This suggests that college subsidies
actually are falling sharply in parental income.37 In order to account for this feature of the data,
without overly distorting the saving decisions at the same time, I choose different values for νlabor
and for νasset . More specifically, I assume that νlabor takes a value of 0.7.
Parameters Calibrated Internally
Discount Factor β . In order to calibrate the discount factor β , I target the ratio of aggregate net
worth to aggregate income for the lower 99 percent wealth quantile in the U.S., which is 3.1 (see
Storesletten et al., 2004a). The result is a β of 0.96. The implied interest rate is 3.6 percent per
annum, which is in the range commonly reported in the literature.
Children’s Weight in Parents’ Utility ς . The parameter ς governs transfer behavior in the
model. It is the intergenerational discount factor and determines the relative weight that parents
assign to their children’s utility in their own utility function. In order to calibrate ς , I target the
ratio of intended transfers to aggregate net worth, i.e. transfers that arise because parents are
altruistic in my model. Gale and Scholz (1994) provide information about intra-family transfers
in the form of inter-vivos transfers, support for college expenses, and bequest, using the 1983 and
the 1986 wave of the SCF. Inter-vivos transfers and support for college expenses are classified as
intended transfers. The flow of both transfer categories amounts to 0.82 percent of total net worth.
Bequests, however, amount to 0.88 percent of aggregate net worth and are therefore quantitatively
more important than both other categories combined. The total transfer flow is thus equal to 1.7
percent of total wealth. As noted by Gale and Scholz (1994), it is not clear whether bequests are
intended or unintended, because there are no markets to insure against uncertainty about lifetime.
35In 1979-80, for youths with families in the bottom income quintile, about 19 percent of college expenses were
covered by parental transfers. The rest was financed with other internal sources (such as student’s income, from which
I abstract) or scholarships, grants or loans. See Keane and Wolpin (2001). Notice that in my specification, college
loans do not count as college subsidies ν . Hence, some students may be able to finance their total college expenses
with the help of external funds.
36Keane and Wolpin (2001) show that parental transfers account for 19 percent of total college expenses if parents
belong to the poorest 25 percent of the population, and 60 percent if parents belong to the richest 75 percent of the
population.
37In this context, it is important to note that the financial aid that a student receives in practice does not necessarily
cover the difference between the EFC and the cost of college, as it is implicit in the EFC procedure. As pointed out by
Dick and Edlin (1997), federal programs do not provide enough subsidized aid to meet the needs of all students, and
most colleges are not committed to covering the entire residual.
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I use my model to compute the total amount of bequests that arise because of missing annuity
markets. Given a discount factor β = 0.96, accidental bequests amount to about 0.3 percent of
total wealth. This implies that, in order to be consistent with the data, the model needs to generate
intended transfers of 1.4 percent of net worth.38 The resulting value for ς is 0.7. A ς of 0.7
implies that a parent household discounts the utility of its child household by 30 percent more than
it discounts its own utility. This is in line with results obtained from Nishiyama (2002) who uses
an altruistic framework to explain the observable degree of wealth inequality in U.S. economy.
Upper Limit on Loans χ¯ . The maximum amount of loans is calibrated to match the fraction of
households with negative or zero financial assets. Because I do not model collateralized debt, such
as mortgages, I use net financial assets, instead of net worth. In 1983, the fraction of households
with negative or zero financial assets was 25 percent (see Table 1 in Wolff, 2000). The result-
ing borrowing limit corresponds to about 30 percent of average college expenses for prospective
college students. Keane and Wolpin (2001) report that college students can expect to finance 25
percent of their college expenses with the help of loans.
Cost of College Education and Dropout Probabilities. Given the choices for the discount
factor β , the intergenerational discount factor ς , the borrowing limit for loans, and the college
subsidies I can now calibrate the parameters that govern the cost of college education, as well as
the dropout probabilities.
The cost of college education/observable abilityK are normally distributed, with density func-
tion f (κ;µf,ep,σf,ep). Recall that in my model, the cost of college education and observable ability
are directly linked. I assume that σf,ep = 1. Innate ability f and parental education ep thus influence
only the mean of the distribution ofK , and not the variance.
I further assume that µf,ep consists of two parts, i.e. µf,ep = κ+∆f,edup . κ is the same for all
prospective students and determines the average level of college enrolment, while ∆f,edup captures
the differences in family background and innate ability.
f takes two realizations, f ∈ {low,high}. This results in four combinations for ∆f,edup and for
λf,ep . Together with κ¯ , there are now nine values which are jointly calibrated.
In order to pin down these parameters, I choose the following nine targets:
• The share of college graduates in the NLSY79, which is 28 percent according to Keane and
Wolpin (2001).
• Another four targets are chosen to make the model consistent with the fact that enrolment
rates increase in AFQT scores, as shown in Belley and Lochner (2007) using the NLSY79.
More specifically, for each of the two bottom ability quartiles, I target the average of the
enrolment rates of the four family income groups reported by Belley and Lochner (2007).
Since differences in enrolment rates between income groups are small for the bottom AFQT
quartiles, averaging provides an accurate description of the enrolment behavior of all income
groups. For the two top AFQT quartiles, differences in college enrolment rates between rich
38Recall that the timing of intended transfers not related to college is indeterminate in my model, unless borrowing
constraints are binding. This implies that one could interpret part of the inter-vivos transfers as bequest.
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and poor families are substantial, as shown by Belley and Lochner (2007). In these cases, I
target the enrolment rates of high-income families only. This group is key for measuring the
impact of borrowing constraints, as will become clear in the results section.
• The last four targets are the college dropout probabilities for different quartiles of observable
scholastic ability, as reported by Chatterjee and Ionescu (2012).39
The choice of these targets ensures that the model is consistent with two patterns in the data,
where college enrolment rates are increasing and dropout rates are falling in measured ability.
With the parameters presented in Table 2, the model is consistent with these patterns. As Table
2 shows, the model fits the data closely.
Additional assumptions are needed in order to identify λ and ∆. The reason is that a priori it
is not clear how the combinations of innate ability and parental education map into the different
observable ability quartiles. I thus assume that ∆low,hs ≥ ∆low,col ≥ ∆high,hs ≥ ∆high,col and λlow,hs ≥
λlow,col ≥ λhigh,hs ≥ λhigh,col . This is equivalent to saying that innate ability has more influence on
the costs and benefits of college than does parental education. I will make use of this assumption
in the next section also to calibrate Γ.
Intergenerational Transmission of Innate Abilities. The intergenerational transmission of
innate ability is governed by a 2x2 transition matrix Γ.
For a given level of parental education, Γ determines how strongly educational achievements
are correlated between generations. If the matrix Γ is identical to the identity matrix, children will
inherit their parents’ type. If Γ is instead given by a matrix where all elements on the antidiagonal
are equal to one, children and parents are of the opposite type.
Using the NLSY79, Keane and Wolpin (2001) report that parents who have a college degree
are 40 percent more likely to have children that are college educated too, compared to high school
educated parents. This suggests that the transmission of f is somewhere in between the two ex-
tremes. I therefore assume that Γ is given by a convex combination of an identity matrix and a
matrix where all elements on the antidiagonal are equal to one. A new parameter ϖ is introduced,
which determines the weight of identity matrix in this linear combination. Intuitively, the role of
this parameter is to shift probability mass to the main diagonal and to make the transmission of
ability more persistent. See Castaneda et al. (2003) for a similar approach.
Additional Moments. In the appendix, I show that the model is consistent with other moments
that were not used as targets in the calibration procedure. I present empirical facts that are infor-
mative about the trade-offs relevant to the college enrolment decision. In particular, I document
39Chatterjee and Ionescu (2012) use the students’ SAT score as a measure of academic ability. Depending the test
score, they divide their sample (which is taken from the Beginning Postsecondary Student Longitudinal Survey (BPS,
1995/96) into four groups, where each group contains between 15 and 35 percent of the total number of students in
their sample (see their Table 2 on page 22). They find that degree completion rates are increasing with the level of
test scores. They report that the degree completion rates for the four groups are 0.659, 0.7627, 0.8462 and 0.8825.
The dropout rates are the complements of these numbers. When computing the degree completion rates, they control
for students who do not put forth effort but simply enroll and drop out shortly after. Since I target the dropout rates
for four different ability quartiles, I interpolate the data from Chatterjee and Ionescu (2012) to compute in-between
values.
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that (i) the distribution of measured ability is skewed to the right, as in the data (see e.g. Gallipoli
et al., 2010); (ii) the implied average college expenses are in line with the data; (iii) the model is
consistent with differences in tuition expenses with respect to ability, as documented McPherson
and Schapiro (2002); and (iv) the model is line with empirical findings regarding the sensitivity
of college enrolment to changes in tuition, as reported by Dynarski (2003). Given the complexity
of the college enrolment decision, it is reassuring that my baseline calibration is able to reproduce
these moments too. More empirical validation is provided in the next section, where I compute the
average enrolment gap in the model, following Carneiro and Heckman (2002). Before doing so, I
outline the calibration of the economy 2000.
Economy 2000
Between 1980 and 2000, the U.S. economy was characterized by an increase in the skill pre-
mium, higher residual earnings inequality and a rise in tuition fees. Since I am interested in a
one-generation response to these changes in the economic conditions, I hold the distribution of
parents constant with respect to the economy 1980. This implies that aggregate prices r and w
must be set exogenously, as they cannot be determined in general equilibrium. In this section, I
discuss how I adjust the parameter values with respect to the economy 1980 such that the model is
consistent with the changes in the economic environment between 1980 and 2000.
Increase in College Premium. Heathcote et al. (2010), in Figure 1, report that the college
wage premium for men rose by about 40 percentage points between the beginning of the 1980s
and 2000. This lines up with other estimates in the literature, see for example Katz and Autor
(1999). The increase in the college premium is implemented by shifting the life cycle earnings
profile of college graduates up, while the mean average earnings of high school graduates is kept
constant, see also Heathcote et al. (2010).
Increase in Earnings Uncertainty. I assume that the residual earnings variance increases from
0.0169 to 0.025 for high school graduates and from 0.0132 to 0.016 for college graduates. These
are the original estimates from HSZ, provided for the 1980s. This was the time when parents
accumulated their savings for college investment to be undertaken in the late 1990s. Clearly, the
variance of residual earnings continued to increase during the 1990s as well (see e.g. Krueger and
Perri, 2006; Heathcote et al., 2010), so my choice is rather conservative.
Decline in the Real Interest Rate r. The real interest rate in the U.S. declined during the
1990s by about 1 percentage point, see Caballero et al. (2008) and Caporale and Grier (2000). I
thus set r = 0.0257, compared to r = 0.0357 in the economy 1980.
Wage Rate w. The wage rate w is computed from r, using the fact that firms are price takers
and maximize profits. w then follows from the first-order conditions of the firms problem. In order
to calculate w, a value for aggregate labor in efficiency units L needs to be imputed as well. L
is determined by the education choice, which in turn depends on w. I start with an initial guess
for L, compute w, solve for the resulting number of college graduates using the optimal decisions
and the distribution of parents given from the economy 1980, and check whether the resulting L is
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consistent with the initial guess. The L resulting from this procedure is 0.5, with wage rate w at
1.28, compared to 1.21 in the economy 1980. Notice that total income in the economy, given by
Y = rKD +wL, where KD denotes total net worth of households, is roughly constant compared to
the economy 1980.
This is important for my next steps. Here, I interpret tuition fees and the borrowing limit in
real terms in order to compare their development over time. Since aggregate income is roughly
constant, this means that the nominal values are equal to the real values.
Increase in Tuition Fees. Between 1980 and 2000, tuition fees doubled in real terms, see
Collegeboard (2005). I adjust κ from 2.6 to 5.2.
Borrowing Limit for College Loans χ¯ . Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2010) report that cu-
mulative Stafford loan limits remained almost identical in real terms between the beginning of the
1980 and 2000 (see their Figure 1). I thus keep χ¯ at its 1980 value of 1.
Other parameters I also need to assign values to the labor tax rate τw and pension benefits
pen. I keep τw constant with respect to its value in the economy 1980 (τw = 0.053). Given w and
τw, pen is found by using the replacement ratio as outlined above.
All other parameters, in particular the preference parameters, are kept unchanged. The param-
eter choices for the economy 2000 are summarized in Table 3.
VI Results
In this section, I analyze the role of borrowing constraints in the economies 1980 and 2000. In
particular, I show the following key results. First, borrowing constraints prevent a large fraction of
households from attending college (24 percent). Second, this fraction increased over time (from
24 to 28 percent). Third, reduced-form estimates of the share of constrained households, based on
differences in enrolment rates between children from rich and poor households, lead researchers to
misinterpret the role of borrowing constraints. And last but not least important, the model outlined
above offers interesting insights for the changing role of family income in determining college
entry.
Economy 1980
Borrowing Constraints. In order to compute the fraction of households that would have enrolled
in college, if access to credit had been unlimited, I increase the upper limit on loans, χ¯ from 1 to
5.40 I hold all other parameters, including the parental distribution as well as aggregate prices r
and w, constant.
40This choice ensures that a large fraction of households can cover their tuition fees. Higher values of χ¯ may even
lead to a larger enrolment rates, however, they are also associated with numerical instabilities. My choice of χ¯ works
in all experiments and thus ensures comparability.
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The rise in college enrolment following the removal of borrowing limits is substantial: the
fraction of college students increases from 36 percent to about 60 percent. This implies that 24
percent of the population are borrowing-constrained in their college decision in the benchmark
calibration.
Below, I compare the results to those obtained in the empirical literature by using reduced-
form approaches. Here, binding borrowing constraints are commonly identified by larger effects
of family income on college enrolment, see e.g. Ellwood and Kane (2000), Carneiro and Heckman
(2002) or Belley and Lochner (2007).
Parental Income as a Determinant of College Enrolment in the Data and in the Model.
In assessing the impact of borrowing constraints, a common approach is to analyze family income
effects. When doing so the literature carefully controls for pre-college ability, e.g. by conditioning
AFQT scores and by controlling for parental education and other proxies. This control is important,
since family income and ability are likely to be correlated.
Table 4 depicts the estimated family income effects on college attendance at age 21 by AFQT
quartiles. The table is based on information in Belley and Lochner (2007), Table 4.
Table 5 shows the corresponding income effects, by quartiles of measured ability, that are
generated by the model. Following Belley and Lochner (2007), I also condition on test scores and
control for parental education.41 I compute family income effects using the stationary distribution
generated by the benchmark calibration.
A visual inspection of Tables 4 and 5 reveals that family income effects in the model are
qualitatively in line with the data. For most ability/family income quartiles, the deviations between
model and data are smaller than one standard error. An exception are children with an AFQT
test score that falls into the second quartile. Here, the model performs poorly, because it predicts
a positive relationship between family income and college enrolment, whereas this relationship
is negative in the data. More future work will be necessary in order to understand why college
enrolment is increasing with family income for most children, but not for those in the second
lowest ability group.
The fact that the model implies a stronger role of family income is potentially problematic,
since it may indicate that the role of borrowing constraints is overstated. In order to assess whether
this claim is true, I drop young households with test scores in the second ability quartile when com-
puting the fraction of borrowing-constrained households. As a result, the fraction of constrained
households falls from 24 to 16 percent and thus remains twice as high as suggested by the estimates
in the previous literature. This is discussed below.42
41Belley and Lochner (2007) control for mother’s education by incorporating dummy variables for high school
graduation and college attendance. Since I do not model high school dropouts and assume that college dropouts are
identical to high school graduates, I only distinguish between high school and college graduates and control for college
graduation.
42The large fraction of potentially constrained households may also appear to be puzzling against the finding of
Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2010), who find that only a few percent of college students borrowed up to the maximum
of what they could from the Stafford loan program at the beginning of the 1980s. However, Brown et al. (2012) show
that a large fraction of parents are unable or unwilling to meet the expected family contribution, which implies that
many children did not even attempt to enroll in college because they were lacking financial support from their parents.
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In the next section, I follow the method of Carneiro and Heckman (2002) and compute the
average income effect. Carneiro and Heckman (2002) interpret this statistic as the fraction of the
population that is financially constrained in their college decision. I show that the average enrol-
ment gap between children from rich and poor families computed with the help of model-generated
data coincides with the empirical counterpart which Carneiro and Heckman (2002) calculated us-
ing the NSLY79.
Reproducing Carneiro and Heckman (2002). Carneiro and Heckman (2002) present a method
for computing the fraction of the population that is financially constrained in their college decision.
Their method has become the standard tool used to address the question of binding borrowing con-
straints; see for example Restuccia and Urrutia (2004), and more recently Bohacek and Kapicka
(2010).
Carneiro and Heckman (2002) use the NLSY79 and compute the fraction of borrowing-constrained
households through the following steps. First, they divide their sample by parents’ income quar-
tiles and children’s ability terciles, using AFQT test scores as a proxy for ability. They assume
that youth with parents in the highest income quartile are not borrowing-constrained. Second, the
college enrolment gaps for each ability and income group with respect to the unconstrained income
quartile are computed. The fraction of the population that is borrowing-constrained is equal to the
average enrollment gap across all groups, which can be computed using population weights.
As pointed out by Carneiro and Heckman (2002), even after controlling for ability, family
income still seems to play an important role for college enrolment. The authors argue that family
resources are likely to produce a number of skills that a single test score cannot capture. Moreover,
family income at the time when students take their college decision is strongly correlated with
family income throughout the life cycle.
Carneiro and Heckman (2002) therefore introduce additional measures for early family back-
ground factors, such as parental education, family structure and place of residence. They find that
enrolment gaps become considerably smaller, after controlling for long-run effects properly. They
conclude that at most 8 percent of the population is financially constrained in their college decision.
In order to apply their method to the data generated by my model, I first compute the college
enrolment rates for all family income/measured ability quartiles. I control for parental education by
focusing on children whose parents have a high school degree only.43 In a second step I calculate,
for each ability quartile, the enrolment gap as the difference in the college enrolment rate between
children from the top income quartile and children from the bottom income quartile. Finally,
I compute the average enrolment gap by using the population weights that are implied by the
equilibrium distribution of my benchmark economy. The average enrolment gap indicates that a
fraction of 6.2 percent of the population in the benchmark economy is financially constrained in
their college decision. This result is perfectly in line with the estimate of Carneiro and Heckman
(2002) from the NLSY79.
Strikingly, the fraction of borrowing-constrained households resulting from the counterfactual
experiment is more than three times as large as suggested by the average enrolment gap.
43This is done for consistency with the rest of my analysis. See Footnote 41. For the same reason, I also group
households according to quartiles, and not terciles, of measured ability.
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In the following subsection, I show that the source of this discrepancy is the fact that the average
enrolment gap identifies borrowing-constrained households only under certain assumptions, which
are not satisfied if parental transfers are generated by one-sided altruism and if intergenerational
borrowing is prohibited.
Identifying Borrowing-Constrained Households. The procedure of Carneiro and Heckman
(2002) identifies the fraction of borrowing-constrained households only if the following assump-
tions are satisfied:
1. In the absence of financial constraints, college enrolment rates are equal for all income
groups (after controlling for ability by using test scores and other proxies, e.g. parental
education).
2. Youth with parents in the top income quartile are not financially constrained in their college
enrolment decision.
Put differently, the first assumption implies that differences between family income groups re-
ported in Table 5 should disappear when borrowing constraints for college education are removed.
Clearly, this is not the case, as Table 6 shows. According to Table 6, children from poor fami-
lies are more likely to enrol in college, compared to children from rich families, in the economy
1980 without borrowing constraints. As a result, the measured impact of family income on college
enrolment becomes negative.
The fact that children from poor families are more eager to enrol in college is a consequence of
the college subsidy system. The costs of attending college are lower for youth from poor families,
because they receive financial aid. Since I control for parental education in Table 6, differences
in tuition are the only source of heterogeneity affecting college decisions of young households. In
particular, other determinants of college enrolment, such as the dropout risk, should be approxi-
mately equal for children within the same ability quartile.44
Clearly, violations of the first assumption have a significant impact on the total number of
constrained households. This is the message of Table 7, which reports the fraction of constrained
households per family income quartile. A large fraction of children with poor parents are borrowing-
constrained. They account for almost 50 percent of the total fraction of households that is finan-
cially constrained in their college decision.
The ultimate reason behind binding borrowing constraints is the fact that parents are unwilling
or unable to provide enough support. Because intergenerational borrowing is not permitted and
altruism is only one-sided, parents face a trade-off between consuming for themselves and trans-
ferring resources to their children. As Table 7 makes clear, all parents face this trade-off, even
those at the top of the income distribution. According to Table 7, two percent of those young
households with rich parents are borrowing-constrained in their college decision. This shows that
the second assumption also is violated. The next subsection sheds further light on the determinants
of parental transfers and the parental trade-off.
44Of course, there are differences in the amount of parental transfers, as I argue below.
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The Role of Altruism. I now describe the results of an experiment in which I set the degree of
altruism, ς , from 0.7 to 0.75. All other parameters, including the distribution of parents, are held
constant with respect to the economy 1980. A higher ς means that parents assign greater weight
to their children’s utility. Put differently, parents become more willing to provide transfers to their
children. This alleviates the impact of borrowing constraints on college enrolment.
There are two important points to learn from this experiment. First, it further illustrates the
fact that reduced-form regressions are unsuitable for identifying borrowing constraints. I find that
the fraction of households that is financially constrained in their college education decision drops
from 24 percent to 22 percent. Strikingly, however, the average enrolment gap, which I computed
following Carneiro and Heckman (2002), increases from 6.2 to 7.2, thus suggesting that borrowing
constraints have tightened, while in fact the opposite is the case.
Second, the above experiment also improves our understanding of the determinants of parental
transfers. The combination of one-sided altruism and intergenerational borrowing limits intro-
duces a trade-off in the parental optimization problem between transferring resources to children
or saving for future consumption. In other words, there is a trade-off between smoothing out
consumption across generations and smoothing out consumption over the life cycle. Changing ς
provides an opportunity to illustrate some of the factors that influence this trade-off.
A comparison of Tables 7 and 8 reveals that the decline in the number of constrained house-
holds is entirely due to a fall in the fraction of constrained children with poor parents. Hence, even
when everyone is more altruistic, implying that parents are more willing to share resources with
their children, this is not sufficient to change the behavior of the rich.
One might have expected the opposite. However, due to the redistributive nature of the pension
system in the model, rich parents need to save more resources in order to smooth out their con-
sumption over the life cycle. Thus, the trade-off between transfers and own saving is tighter for
the rich, all other things equal. In the next section, I argue that this trade-off is key for explaining
the changing role of family income in determining college entry.
Economy 2000
Over the last decades, the U.S. economy has experienced a sharp increase in tuition fees and in
earnings inequality, both between and within education groups. At the same time, borrowing limits
remained constant in real terms and the real interest rate declined by 1 percentage point.
In this subsection, I use my model to analyze the impact of these changes on the link between
college enrolment and family income, as well as on the development of the fraction of borrowing-
constrained households over time. I start by briefly reviewing the stylized facts.
Empirical Evidence. Ellwood and Kane (2000) and Belley and Lochner (2007) present evi-
dence showing that the impact of family income as a determinant of college enrolment has become
more important over time. This can be seen by comparing Tables 4 and 9, which are based on
results from Belley and Lochner (2007).
In addition, Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2010) report that borrowing limits for student loans
remained constant while tuition fees doubled (in real terms). This means that the ratio of borrowing
opportunities to tuition fees decreased over time. Borrowing limits became tighter in real terms.
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Together with the changing role of family income as determinant of college entry, this suggests
that borrowing constraints are now binding for a larger fraction of the population, relative to the
beginning of the 1980s.
I use my model to shed more light on this point. Before doing so, I describe the development
of the enrolment gap in the model.
The Changing Role of Family Income in the Model. Table 10 shows the impact of family
income in the economy 2000. A comparison with the income effects in the economy 1980 (see
Table 5) reveals that family income is more important in the economy 2000, relative to the econ-
omy 1980. Qualitatively, this is in accordance with the data. Quantitatively, however, the model
overstates the impact of family income in the economy 2000, in particular for youth with high
levels of measured ability.
In order to summarize the impact of family income on college enrolment with the help of a
single number, I follow the procedure by Carneiro and Heckman (2002) and compute the average
enrolment gap as outlined above. I find that the average enrolment gap is 15.7 percent in the
economy 2000, relative to 6.2 percent in the economy 1980. Clearly, family income is more
important in determining college enrolment in the economy 2000.
The Development of the Fraction of Constrained Households. The fraction of households
that is financially constrained in their college enrolment decision is 28 percent in the economy
2000. Hence, the share of constrained households increased over time, from 24 to 28 percent. Thus,
in the model, the growing role of family income as a determinant for college entry is associated
with a higher fraction of constrained households.
I compute the share of constrained households by adjusting the limit on student loans, χ¯ , from
1 to 5, and by measuring the associated change in the overall college enrolment rate. All other
parameters are held constant, including the aggregate prices r and w and the distribution of parents
at age 51.
Are Tighter Borrowing Constraints Responsible for the Changing Role of Family Income
in Determining College Entry? I now analyze whether the fact that borrowing limits became
tighter, relative to the costs of tuition, is responsible for the increase in enrolment gaps between
students from rich and poor families and for the associated increase in number of borrowing con-
strained households.
I design an experiment in which borrowing limits on student loans rise in accordance with
tuition fees. Since average tuition fees doubled between 1980 and 2000, I raise χ¯ from 1 to 2. All
other parameters, including the distribution of parents at age 51, remain constant.
According to this experiment, tighter borrowing limits account only partly for the changing
role of family income. If χ¯ is increased to 2, the average enrolment gap drops from 15.7 percent
to 10.5 percent. Hence, the enrolment gap is still a lot larger than the 6.2 percent measured for the
economy 1980.
At the same time, the relative tightening of borrowing limits seems to be responsible for an
increase in the fraction of constrained households over time that is implausibly large, given the
overall change in the fraction of constrained households between the economies 1980 and 2000.
Instead of 28 percent, only 18 percent of households are constrained if I increase χ¯ from 1 to 2.
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Together, these two observations suggest that tighter borrowing constraints are not the sole
explanation for the increase in the fraction of constrained households and the growing importance
of family income as a determinant for college enrolment.
Changes in the Distribution of Constrained Households. According to the model, not only
the number of constrained households changed, but also their share in each family income quartile.
This can be seen by comparing Tables 7 and 12. In 1980, 47 percent of children with poor parents
are constrained. In the economy 2000, only 17 percent of children in the bottom family income
quartile are constrained. At the same time, the fraction of constrained households in the top income
quartile rose from 2 percent to 16 percent. Similarly, among children with parents in the second
highest income quartile, the fraction of constrained households increased from 19 to 32 percent.
This shift in the distribution is difficult to reconcile with a theory in which tighter borrowing
limits are the sole driver behind the increase in the fraction of borrowing-constrained households.
In this case, the rise in the number of constrained households would stem from a larger fraction of
constrained households at the lower end of the income distribution.
Parental Transfers and the Changing Role of Family Income. Understanding the causes
behind the changing role of family income and the larger number of borrowing-constrained house-
holds has significant policy relevance.
Here, I argue that parental transfers are key for explaining these changes as well as the shift in
the distribution of constrained children.
The development in the aggregate size of transfers is striking. While tuition fees doubled in
real terms, the ratio of parental inter-vivos transfers relative to output falls from 3.6 percent in the
economy 1980 to 3.3 percent in the economy 2000.45 This suggests that, on the aggregate level,
parental support is not sufficient to cover the increase in tuition fees. As a consequence, more
students need to rely on loans to finance their studies. The fraction of households in debt increases
from 22 percent in 1980 to 24 percent in 2000.
Parental transfers shrunk in real terms, because the increase in earnings inequality raises earn-
ings uncertainty. This means that parents become more reluctant to transfer resources to their
children, as they shift to accumulating more precautionary savings.
The increase in earnings inequality also worsens the position of families at the lower end of
the distribution. In the economy 2000, poor families have less income in absolute terms, compared
to the economy 1980. Since poor families transfer less, all other things equal, the fall in income
at the lower end of the distribution implies that children from the bottom quartile of the income
distribution receive less support, relative to the economy 1980.
As a consequence, children from poor families need to take out more loans to finance their
studies. This is because in the model, college subsidies never cover the full amount of tuition fees,
45Notice that I keep the distribution of parents at age 51, the age in which transfers are made, constant across all
experiments with respect to the economy 1980. I also conducted experiments where the distribution of parents adjusts,
such that it reproduces itself in equilibrium. In this case, the fact that parents internalize the increase in tuition fees
and adjust their savings accordingly shifts the wealth distribution of parents at the age at which transfers are made.
Parental transfers are higher in equilibrium, and the fraction of constrained households is thus significantly lower. The
overall mechanisms at play are the same, however. Results from these experiments, which were also circulated in an
earlier version of this paper, can be obtained upon request.
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in line with evidence by Keane and Wolpin (2001) and Brown et al. (2012). The fact that tuition
fees are higher in the economy 2000 increases the amount of borrowing, all other things equal.
Notice that the increase in the college premium raises the return of college attendance, ceteris
paribus. Since the real interest rate declines between 1980 and 2000, borrowing becomes also
cheaper. Despite this, children from poor families are discouraged from attending college, even if
funding is readily available. This is because bigger leverage makes the decision to enrol in college
more risky. Loans need to be paid back in full, even if the student fails to graduate, see Chatterjee
and Ionescu (2012).
As for children of rich households, their parents are relatively richer compared to the economy
1980. This makes the parents more likely to provide transfers, all other things equal. However,
the larger transfers do not keep pace with the rise in tuition. As a consequence, children from rich
families also need to rely more on external funding to finance their studies in the economy 2000.
The fraction of tuition that they need to finance through borrowing is smaller, though, than for those
children from poor families. Hence, the joint decline in parental transfers and rising tuition fees
modifies the risk-return trade-off between attending college for children at different parts of the
family income distribution, such that children from rich families are more eager to attend college,
and children with poor families are less so, compared to the economy 1980.
In sum, the joint development of parental transfers and (net) tuition across the family income
distribution is able to generate (i) the increase in enrolment gaps between 1980 and 2000; (ii)
an increase in the overall fraction of borrowing-constrained households; and (iii) a shift in the
distribution of constrained children.
VII Conclusion
This paper analyzes the determinants of college enrolment in the U.S. and how these have changed
over time. I propose a rich quantitative life cycle model with college enrolment. An important
feature of the model is that altruistic parents provide financial support to their children. Using
counterfactual experiments, I find that 24 percent of all households were financially constrained in
their college decision at the beginning of the 1980s. The share of constrained households increased
to 28 percent at the beginning of the 2000s.
The large fraction of borrowing-constrained households contrasts sharply with the findings in
the previous literature. Using a reduced-form approach, Carneiro and Heckman (2002) concluded
in a highly influential paper that at most 8 percent of households are financially constrained in their
college decision. I replicate the procedure of Carneiro and Heckman (2002) using enrolment data
generated by my model. I show that the reduced-form estimates obtained from the data and model
coincide.
The considerable discrepancy between reduced-form estimates and counterfactual experiments
suggests that reduced-form approaches do not correctly identify constrained households. Using
the counterfactual enrolment data generated by my model, I show that the assumptions needed in
order to identify constrained households through enrolment gaps are not fulfilled.
The interplay between parental transfers and college enrolment decisions of young households
is a major factor underlying the difference. I conclude that a structural model of parental transfers
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and college enrolment is necessary to identify constrained households adequately.
Two model assumptions turn out to be key for explaining the large share of borrowing-constrained
households and its development over time, as well as the changing role of family income in de-
termining college entry. First, parental altruism is only one-sided. And second, intergenerational
borrowing is not permitted. These assumptions imply that parents face a trade-off between trans-
ferring resources to their children and saving for their own future consumption. As a consequence,
college investment may be inefficiently low, even for children whose parental resources exceed the
cost of college education.
This finding means that even controlling for parental resources, as it is typically done in
reduced-form estimates, does not guarantee that constrained households are identified correctly.
Moreover, the increase in earnings uncertainty observable between 1980 and 2000 increases house-
hold’s need to self-insure. As a result, the amount of resources parents transfer to their children
declines in the aggregate. The fraction of constrained households increases. The rise in within-
group earnings inequality instead contributes to wider enrolment gaps between children from rich
and poor families.
An important extension of this paper would be to model the determinants of academic ability
more carefully. Mainly for simplicity, I assumed here that children’s ability is determined partly by
parental education, and partly by innate ability (which is also partly inherited from parents). I will
leave it for future research to replace this reduced form with a more structural approach, in which
early education is taken explicitly into account. By extending my model in this direction one could,
for example, investigate how (intergenerational) borrowing constraints at various stages in the life
cycle interact. This extended model could be used to study the design of optimal education policies,
a question I did not consider in this paper. Moreover, a structural model of the transmission of
abilities could shed more light on the complex interaction between family income and children’s
ability in determining college entry.
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VIII Appendix I: Tables
Table 1: Calibrated Parameters with Direct Empirical Counterpart for "Economy 1980"
Parameter Description Value
ψ j survival probabilities see text
α capital share of income 0.36
δ capital depreciation rate 0.08
γ risk aversion 1.5
εej life cycle earnings profile see text
ρhs earnings persistence high school 0.946
ρhs variance shocks 0.015
ρcol earnings persistence college 0.955
σ col variance shocks 0.010
τK capital income tax rate 0.2
rep replacement ratio pensions 0.4
ν0 max. share of tuition fees financed by subsidies 0.75
νasset impact of capital income on college subsidies 0.2
νasset impact of labor income on college subsidies 0.7
Notes: The source for all parameters describing the income process (εej , ρe and σ e) is
Hubbard et al. (1995). For detailed information regarding modifications and definitions,
please refer to the main text.
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Table 3: Parameters characterizing the Economy 2000
Parameter Description Value 1980 2000
σhs variance shocks 0.015 0.025
σ col variance earnings shocks 0.01 0.016
χ¯ upper limit on loans 1 1
κ¯ average cost of college 2.16 5.2
r interest rate 0.0357 0.0257
w wage rate 1.21 1.28
Notes: This table compares the parameter values of the economy 1980 and the economy
2000. Important: the increase in the college premium is achieved by multiplying the age-
earnings profile εej by 1.4. All other parameter values, not mentioned in this table, are
identical in both economy 1980 and 2000. For detailed information regarding modifica-
tions and definitions, please refer to the main text.
Table 4: Effects of Family Income on College Attendance at Age 21 by AFQT Quartile, NLSY79.
Ability Quartile:
1 2 3 4
Family Income Quartile 2 0.0273 -0.0526 0.0956 0.0862
(0.0408) (0.0547) (0.0668) (0.0544)
Family Income Quartile 3 0.0258 -0.0730 0.1222 0.0887
(0.0490) (0.0572) (0.0664) (0.0544)
Family Income Quartile 4 0.1171 -0.0486 0.1818 0.1541
(0.0600) (0.0627) (0.0691) (0.0539)
Notes: Estimates obtained from Table 4 in Belley and Lochner (2007), Panel A. Regressions include
dummy variables for mother’s education and other controls. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
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Table 5: Effects of Family Income on College Attendance at Age 21 by Ability Quartile, Model
Economy 1980.
Ability Quartile:
1 2 3 4
Family Income Quartile 2 0.0716 0.1777 0.1882 0.1391
Family Income Quartile 3 0.0491 0.1342 0.1427 0.1031
Family Income Quartile 4 0.0696 0.2160 0.2314 0.1606
Notes: Family income is measured at the time the college decision is taken (age=21).
Ability refers to measurable ability, as defined in the main text. Family income effects
are measured as the difference from the enrolment rate of the lowest income quartile. I
control for parental education, as described in the main text.
Table 6: Effects of Family Income on College Attendance at Age 21 by Ability Quartile, Model
Economy 1980, No Borrowing Limit on Student Loans
Ability Quartile:
1 2 3 4
Family Income Quartile 2 -0.0995 0.0527 0.0677 -0.0026
Family Income Quartile 3 -0.2369 -0.0477 -0.0289 -0.1166
Family Income Quartile 4 -0.3696 -0.1687 -0.1477 -0.2441
Notes: Family income is measured at the time the college decision is taken (age=21).
Ability refers to measurable ability, as defined in the main text. Family income effects
are measured as the difference from the enrolment rate of the lowest income quartile. I
control for parental education, as described in the main text.
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Table 7: Fraction of households constrained in their college decision, per income quartile, Econ-
omy 1980
% constrained
Family Income Quartile 1 47
Family Income Quartile 2 31
Family Income Quartile 3 19
Family Income Quartile 4 2
Remark: Table shows the fraction (expressed in percent-
age) of households that are financially constrained in their
college decision for each family income quartile.
Table 8: Fraction of households constrained in their college decision, per income quartile, Econ-
omy 1980, Experiment ς = 0.75
% constrained
Family Income Quartile 1 38
Family Income Quartile 2 27
Family Income Quartile 3 19
Family Income Quartile 4 2
Remark: Table shows the fraction (expressed in percent-
age) of households that are financially constrained in their
college decision for each family income quartile.
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Table 9: Effects of Family Income on College Attendance at Age 21 by AFQT Quartile, NLSY97.
Ability Quartile:
1 2 3 4
Family Income Quartile 2 -0.0560 0.0766 0.0518 0.0869
(0.0460) (0.0556) (0.0544) (0.0431)
Family Income Quartile 3 0.1336 0.1545 0.0957 0.0520
(0.0559) (0.0590) (0.0564) (0.0424)
Family Income Quartile 4 0.2793 0.1611 0.1992 0.0905
(0.0656) (0.0616) (0.0582) (0.0437)
Notes: Estimates obtained from Table 4 in Belley and Lochner (2007), Panel B. Regressions include
dummy variables for mother’s education and other controls. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Table 10: Effects of Family Income on College Attendance at Age 21 by Ability Quartile, Model
Economy 2000.
Ability Quartile:
1 2 3 4
Family Income Quartile 2 0.0671 0.2568 0.2755 0.1879
Family Income Quartile 3 0.0288 0.2064 0.2241 0.1417
Family Income Quartile 4 0.1874 0.3952 0.4185 0.3141
Notes: Family income is measured at the time the college decision is taken (age=21).
Ability refers to measurable ability, as defined in the main text. Family income effects
are measured as the difference from the enrolment rate of the lowest income quartile. I
control for parental education, as described in the main text.
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Table 11: Effects of Family Income on College Attendance at Age 21 by Ability Quartile, Model
Economy 2000, No Borrowing Limits on Student Loans
Ability Quartile:
1 2 3 4
Family Income Quartile 2 0.4680 0.4624 0.4618 0.4644
Family Income Quartile 3 0.1215 0.3187 0.3383 0.2468
Family Income Quartile 4 0.1077 0.2877 0.3078 0.2174
Notes: Family income is measured at the time the college decision is taken (age=21).
Ability refers to measurable ability, as defined in the main text. Family income effects are
measured as the difference to the enrolment rate of the lowest income quartile. I control
for parental education, as described in the main text.
Table 12: Fraction of households constrained in their college decision, per income quartile, Econ-
omy 2000.
% constrained
Family Income Quartile 1 17
Family Income Quartile 2 45
Family Income Quartile 3 32
Family Income Quartile 4 16
Remark: Table shows the fraction (expressed in percent-
age) of households that are financially constrained in their
college decision for each family income quartile.
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IX Appendix II: Additional Empirical Validation
The distribution of observable ability in my model implies a certain distribution of tuition. The
distribution of tuition, in turn, is key for explaining college enrolment rates as well as the fraction
of borrowing-constrained households. In this section, I present a number of stylized facts related
to college enrolment behavior. I argue that my quantitative model is consistent with these facts.
Skewness of the Observable Ability Distribution. The distribution of measured ability levels
that results from these parameter choices is skewed to the right, with a median (-3.15) which is
smaller than the mean (-2.9). Right-skewness of skills is often found in empirical work; see for
example Gallipoli et al. (2010), who compute the distribution of AFQT results in the NLSY.
Average Direct Cost of College Education. The average amount students pay in the model
(based on their measured ability), relative to GDP per capita, is 2.1. Notice that this is for four
years of education, before need-based financial aid is subtracted.
The respective ratio in the data is 1.7. This takes into account the average yearly fees for tuition,
room and board charged by 4-year institutions (public and private), which was approximately 5,000
USD at the beginning of the 1980s (in 1980 USD) (see the Digest of Educational Statistics). GDP
per capita was about 12,000 USD (current prices) in 1980 (see World Bank Economic Indicators).
Distribution of direct cost of college education. I now turn to the distribution of direct cost
that prospective students face. McPherson and Schapiro (2006) report that 100 points more in the
SAT score lower total tuition fees by between 500 to 2,300 USD. According to Chatterjee and
Ionescu (2012), the difference between the 30th percentile and the 65th percentile in the distribu-
tion of SAT scores is exactly 200 points. That means that students at the 65th percentile of the
distribution of observable abilities pay between 8 and about 40 percent less than students at the
30th percentile do, measured in terms of per-capita GDP. In my model, the respective difference
is 50 percent. The distribution of SAT scores is highly non-linear (see Chatterjee and Ionescu,
2012). The same applies to the distribution of observable abilities in the model. A comparison of
percentiles that are farther apart thus becomes increasingly difficult. It is interesting to note that the
fraction of the population that faces tuition costs of zero or less is small (less than 1 percent). Gen-
erous scholarships at many U.S. schools are typically reserved to the top 1 percent of the applicant
pool.
Sensitivity of college enrolment to tuition. Dynarski (2003) estimates that subsidizing college
with an additional 1,000 USD (in 1998 USD) increases college enrolment by about 4 percentage
points. I find that giving an equivalent amount to college students in the benchmark calibration
raises college enrolment by 3.5 percentage points. In line with empirical evidence, I also find that
the response to changes in tuition decreases with family income. I therefore conclude that the
model well describes the sensitivity of college enrolment with respect to changes in tuition.
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X Appendix III: Solution Algorithm
I solve the quantitative model using a nested fixed point algorithm. The outer loop searches for
a fixed point in the interest rate, while the inner loop solves the dynamic program given by (1) -
(7) as described in the next section. The inner loop solves the hybrid model which nests both the
pure life cycle economy and a model with infinitely lived dynasties as special cases. The hybrid
nature of the model manifests itself in the fact that the parental value function Vp,w(s31p,w) contains
the discounted future utility of the child and vice versa. I follow Laitner (2001) when solving this
problem. I start with a guess for the parental value function, V ′p,w(s31p,w). Given this guess, I solve
the child’s problem as specified in (5), (4), (6) and (7). I describe the solution technique in greater
detail in the next section. I then compute an update for the parental value function, V ′′p,w(s31p,w). I
repeat this process until convergence is achieved.46
Computing the Decision Rules
I compute the optimal decision rules for consumption and saving by adapting the "endogenous grid
point method" (EGM), first outlined by Carroll (2006).47 The EGM derives the optimal choices
based on inverting the first-order conditions, for a given grid of tomorrow’s asset choices. As a
result, a grid of corresponding optimal asset levels for today’s problem arises.48
Notice that the program specified by (1) - (7) can be simplified by assuming that parents take
the education decision on behalf of their children. This can be done because parents are altruistic,
which implies that they anticipate the division of their transfers that is optimal from the children’s
point of view. Technically, this means that the problem (7) can be integrated into problem (3).
Different from "standard" dynamic programming problems, the program contains a discrete
choice, namely the education decision. The presence of a discrete choice may generate kinks in
the parental value function Vp,w(s31p,w), leading to non-differentiable and non-concave parts. Only
young households who receive transfers above a certain threshold are able to attend college. This
in turn implies that only parents whose wealth is higher than a certain threshold may be able to
provide sufficiently high transfers, such that their children are able to attend college. While it can
be shown that first-order conditions are still necessary for optimality in this case (see Clausen and
Strub, 2011), they are not sufficient anymore.49 Concavity guarantees that the solution is a global
maximum and thus is a desirable property of any maximization problem.
Fortunately, there are several model features which smooth out the kinks generated by the
education choice. First of all, parental transfers can be used for college and non-college related
expenditures. At the threshold, when young households decide to enter college, they are forced
to reduce their other consumption expenditures accordingly. The resulting utility loss partly out-
weighs the utility gain associated with college attendance. Therefore, the kink in the (parental)
46The algorithm converges at a geometric rate, see Laitner (2001).
47An exception is the parental problem (3), for reasons that I explain in the next paragraph.
48Thus its name "endogenous grid method".
49Clausen and Strub (2011) derive envelope theorems for non-concave and non-smooth optimization problem. They
show that optimal decisions are never at the kinks induced by discrete choices.
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value function at the threshold is less pronounced.50 Second of all, skill accumulation in the form
of college success and (observable) ability is stochastic. Uncertainty generates a "smoothing ef-
fect", as demonstrated by Gomes et al. (2001).
It turns out that these two model elements are sufficient to make Vp,w(s31p,w) concave. Vp,w(s
31
p,w)
is plotted in Figure 2. In order to make sure that this finding is not the result of some kind of
numerical approximation routine, I solve the parental problem in j = 31 using a standard grid
search procedure.
Small ConstantΨ . In a few instances, the code generates zero consumption when computing
the optimal policy function. This is the case when the routine computes the optimal consumption
and saving decisions for households with no wealth and with labor income that is approximately
equal to the repayment of student loans. If the difference between the latter two values is very,
very, close, the computer program produces a zero while in fact the difference is distinct from zero
(machine zero).
Hence, household consumption is zero and marginal utility is infinity. The problem is no longer
well-defined, and the software produces a missing value in these cases. Through the iterations, the
missing values are distributed to the whole state space and the program crashes.
In order to avoid this, I add a very small constant Ψ to the income component in the budget
constraint of the young households. This is a common device in the literature, see e.g. Heer and
Maußner (2005), Ch. 7. I chooseΨ = 10−11. Together with the maximum amount of loans I use
to compute the counterfactual (χ¯ = 5), this choice turns out to be sufficient to avoid numerical
instabilities in all the experiments I conducted. I use the software package Gauss 9.0 (32-bit) on a
Windows XP operating system.
Computation of the Equilibrium
Using the policy functions computed previously, I can now solve for the equilibrium allocation.
Computing an equilibrium involves the following steps:
1. Choose the policy parameters, that is, determine the social security replacement rate rep, the
tax rate for capital income τk and a college subsidy rule ν .
2. Provide an initial guess for the aggregate (physical) capital stock K0, the aggregate human
capital stock H0 and the labor tax rate τw. Given the guesses for K and H, use the first-order
conditions from the firm’s problem to obtain the relative factor prices r and w.
3. Compute the optimal decision rules as outlined in the previous section.
4. Compute the time invariant measure Φ of agents over the state space.
50A similar argument applies to the savings of a parent household in model period j = 31. Parental savings incre-
ment parental wealth holdings, which are part of the child household’s state space. Because parents decide simulta-
neously about savings and transfers, given their budget constraint in j = 31, an increase in transfers reduces savings,
all other things equal. From the point of view of the children, the utility loss associated with a reduction in savings
partially outweighs the utility gain associated with an increase in transfers.
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5. Compute the aggregate asset holdings K1 and the new human capital stock L1 using the asset
market clearing condition. Given K1 and L1, update r, w and τw.
6. If m = max
(
K1−K0
K1
, L1−L0L1
)
< 10−3 stop; otherwise return to step 2 and replace K0 with K1
and L0 with L1.
In step 4, I find the time-invariant measure of agents Φ by iterating on the aggregate law of
motion, as is commonly done in models with an infinite time horizon. In the model, the measure
of parents in their first period of adulthood depends on the transition of children (because all
parents were children one period before). In turn, the measure of children in their first period of
life depends on the measure of their parents (because children receive transfers and education).
Stationarity requires that the probability measure is constant over time. This implies that, for a
given measure of parents, the measure of children exactly reproduces the measure of their own
parents.
I approximate the measure of agents by means of a probability density function.51 The density
function is computed and stored on a finite set of grid points. Following Ríos-Rull (1997), I choose
a grid Ddensity which is finer than the one used in the previous step for computing the decision rules,
that is D ⊆ Ddensity. Choosing a finer grid for the density increases the precision with which the
aggregate variables are computed.52
The optimal choice will almost surely be off-grid. In order to map the optimal choices onto the
grid, I introduce a kind of lottery. An individual with asset choice a′(.) ∈ (ai,ai+1) is interpreted
as choosing asset holdings ai with probability λ and asset holdings ai+1 with probability (1−λ )
where λ solves a′(.) = λai +(1−λ )ai+1. That is, I compute a piecewise linear approximation to
the density function. No lottery is needed for agents for which the lower bounds on asset holdings
is binding, as is the case for a positive fraction of the population. I thus allocate the grid points
such that they are closely spaced in the neighborhood of the lower bound. This is achieved by
choosing grid points which are equally spaced in logarithms. I select the upper bound of Ddensity
and D such that it is never found to be binding.
I find the time-invariant measure of agents Φ by iterating on the aggregate law of motion.
The forward recursion starts with an initial distribution of young agents in model period j = 1,Φ1.
This requires an initial guess for the distribution of parents in model period j = 31. Following Heer
(2001), a uniform distribution is taken as an initial guess. Using the decision rules, one can then
derive Φ31, from which an update of Φ1 can be obtained. Φ31 is then updated until convergence.
As a check on the internal consistency, aggregate consumption, investment, transfers and output
are computed in order to ensure that the good market clearing condition is approximately satisfied.
51Heer and Maußner (2005) argue that approximating the time-invariant measure of agents with the help of a density
function saves up to 40 percent of CPU time compared to an approximation using the distribution. Computing the
distribution function requires computing the inverse of the policy function.
52The gains in precision (as measured by aggregate excess demand) by doing so are enormous. The reason is that
the aggregate good market clearing condition is just a weighted average of the individuals’ budget constraints, where
the weights are derived from the grid points of the density Φ. The finer the grid in Φ, the better the correspondence
between the optimal policies and the resulting weights will be, leading to better aggregation results.
49
 
 
 
Figure 2: Value function for different levels of household wealth, after controlling for education,
productivity and children’s ability shock
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